Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet

Institutt for økonomi

Produksjonsdato : 2001-01-25
Katalogtype: Fullformat.

1
PublKat: B01 (Faglig bok, rapport m.v. utgitt på forlag (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Informasjonsproblem og økonomisk organisering
Red:     Torsvik, Gaute
ISBN:    82-7674-199-1
År:      1997
Volum:   In press
Utgiver: Fagbokforlaget
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r96006268
StatKat: f
LokalK:  PN

2
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Agell, Jonas
         Department of Economics, Uppsala University
Medforf: Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Minimum wages and the incentives for skill formation
Tidskr:  Journal of Public Economics
År:      1997-01
Volum:   64
Hefte:   156
Side(r): 25-40
Utgiver: Elsevier Sciences S.A
Emneord: Minimum wage; Wage differential; Education; Labor market exclusion
SamEng:  We show that a minimum wages may have beneficial effects on human cap
         ital allocation in a situation when the marginal product of skilled l
         abor is shared between firn and worker acc ording to bargaining stren
         gth. Firms prefer more productive workers to less productive ones, an
         d workers that do not match up to a certain productivity floor are no
         t hired. A minimumwage increases the productivity requirement. To han
         g on to the primary sector, workers of intermediate talent are then i
         nduced to acquire more education, while there is a doscouragement eff
         ect for workers of lesser talent. A minimum wage can increase welfare
          even in cases where total education goes down. When the minimum wage
          is detrimental to welfare, the problem is typically that some worker
         es acquire too much education in the firs place.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008084
StatKat: f
LokalK:  A

3
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Amundsen, Eirik S
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Nesse, Arvid
Medforf: Tjøtta, Sigve
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Deregulation of the Nordic power market and environmental policy
Serie:   Working paper
År:      1997-06-20
Hefte:   0697
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: deregulation, Nordic power integration, environmental policy
SamEng:  A common Nordic power market will reduce total CO2 emission in the No
         rdic countries as compared to a situation of autarky and, thus, reduc
         e the aggregate cost of complying to strict national CO2 emissions ta
         rgets. A common market for CO2 emission permits may reduce the aggreg
         ate cost further, but this cost reduction will be smaller the harser
         the CO2 emission constraints are. The economic gain of introducing a
         common Nordic power market will be particularly large in the case of
         a swedish nuclear power phase out. In the cost reduction of int roduc
         ing a common market for CO2 emission permits will not be very large.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008079
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

4
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder
Medforf: Bjørndal, Trond
Tittel:  Collapse of a biomass
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-02
Hefte:   0197
Side(r): 27
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: bioeconomics, stock collapse, optimal management
SamNor:  This paper examines how to harvest a biomass exposed to a potential c
         ollapse at an uncertain date. We show that the uncertaintly involved
         gives rise to two counteracting effects determining the optimal stock
          of the biomass: an "extinction effect", working i the direction of a
          larger stock. The net effects is indeterminate and depends upon the
         failure rate and the function relating the extendt of the collapse an
         d the size of the pre-collapse stock. For some combinations of failur
         e rate and collapse-function it is shown that a strategy riskin g tot
         al extinction may be optimal, even though the biomass could have been
          saved with certaintly. However, for other combinations, a strategy o
         f extreme precaution implying no harves t prior to the calamity may t
         urn out to be optimal. Repetitive colapse leads to a smaller steady-s
         tate stock as compared to one-shot collapse.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97004453
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

5
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Gas power production, surplus concepts and the transformation of hydro
          electric rent into resource rent
Tidskr:  Resource and Energy Economics
År:      1997
Volum:   19
Hefte:   163
Side(r): 241-259
Utgiver: Elsevier Science B.V
Emneord: Thermal power; Hydropower; Economic rent
SamEng:  The paper considers the effects of introducing large scale gas power
         production capacity into an electricity sector based on hydropower. I
         n this process the economic rent is transmitted from the hydro power
         sector to the resource rent into the gas power sector, but is along t
         he way intermingled with ordinary producer surplus and quasi-rent ste
         mming from increasing cost conditions in the production infrastructur
         e and capacity constraint. The net effect on total rent generated dep
         ends on development in demand, demand elasticities, costs saved from
         delaying hydropower projects and the existence of producer surplus in
          gas power generation. The paper closes with a discussion of possible
          tax base changes following from the introduction of a thermal power
         system based on natural gas
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008193
StatKat: f

6
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Tjøtta, Sigve
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Trade and Price Variation in an Integrated European Power Market
Tidskr:  Applied Economics
ISSN:    0003-6846
År:      1997
Volum:   29
Hefte:   158
Side(r): 745-757
SamNor:  This paper examines the potential gains in terms of increased social
         surplus from integrating the power markets in Europe and Assesses the
         scope fo free seasonal and diurnal tradein a setting of Third Party
         Access (TPA). We construct an equilibrium model at the level of the
         wholesale markets, taking account of the existing power generating
         infrastructure (of varying flexibility) as well as the existing
         transmission network interconnecting the countries involved. The
         model indicates an overall gain from integrating the power markets.
         Electricity prices are substantially reduced for all regions
         involved, thus implying a significant redistribution of income from
         producers to consumers. Trade flourishes with regions establ ishing
         themselves as either pure exporters, pure importers or as
         intermediaries acting as transit countries.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97007642
StatKat: f

7
PublKat: D01 (Invitert foredrag ved vit. konf. med publisert artikkel (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Armstrong, Claire
         Universitetet i Tromsø, Norges fiskerihøgskole
Tittel:  Forvaltningen av fiskeressursene - fordeling mellom hav og kyst.
Tidskr:  Fiskerisamfunn og offentlig styring. Konferanse i Honningsv
         åg 27. november 1997.. Fiskeindustriens lokale betydning i
         en global .. Arbeidsnotat.. 1
Red:     Lindkvist, Knut Bjørn
År:      1997-11-27
Side(r): 47-52
Utgiver: Kystnæringssenteret, Honningsvåg; Institutt for geografi
Konfer:  Fiskerisamfunn og offentlig styring.
Sted:    Honningsvåg, Norge
Emneord: Fiskeriøkonomi, fordelingspolitikk, ressursforvaltning, TAC, Norge
SamNor:  Om biologiske og økonomiske (bioøkonomiske) effekter av "Trålstigen",
          Norges Fiskarlags vedtatte nøkkel for fordeling av fiskerikvoter mel
         lom trålerfåten og den konvensjonelle fangstgruppen (kystfiskerne).
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r98024498
StatKat: f
LokalK:  Ns

8
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Askildsen, Jan Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Ireland, Norman
         University of Warwick
Tittel:  Union-firm bargaining over long term benefits
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-03
Hefte:   1297
Side(r): 30 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: Union-firm bargaining, pensions, contracts, commitment.
SamEng:  The paper studies bargaining over workers`benefits which are due some
          time in the future. A union bargains on behalf of a workforce which
         may be diverse in the sense that workers`prohabilities of staying wit
         h the firm vary. Bargaining structure, rather than the bargaining pow
         er of the union, is the driving force for determining the level of be
         nefits. A key issue is that of whose preferences are represented in t
         he union`s objective function, and thereby in the bargaining process.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008200
StatKat: f

9
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Bonin, Holger
         Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg
Medforf: Raffelhüschen, Bernd
         Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg
Medforf: Walliser, Jan
         Congressional Budget Office
Tittel:  Can immigration alleviate the demographic burden?
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-05
Hefte:   0797
Side(r): 30 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: Migration, Generational Accounting
SamEng:  This paper investigates the dynamic impacts of immigration on aging p
         opulations. Employing a modified method of Generational Accounting we
          calculat the net contribution of migrants to the public purses in Ge
         rmany. We show that the fiscal contribution of future immigrants will
          be positive, assuming they resemble current alien residents in their
          economic characteristics. Therefore, immigration significantly decre
         ases the fiscal burden of future resident generations. It is also sho
         wn that an active policy which discriminates in favor of young and hi
         ghskilled immigrants would considerably enlarge the positive long-run
          impact of immigration. However, even high population inflows cannot
         remove the pressure induced by the aging of the population in Germany
         .
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008195
StatKat: f

10
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Brunstad, Rolf Jens
         The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Medforf: Gaasland, Ivar
         SNF
Medforf: Vårdal, Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Agricultural production and the optimal level of landscape preservatio
         n
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997
Hefte:   1097
Side(r): 15 s.
Utgiver: Instiutt for økonomi
Emneord: Agricultural support, market failure, public goods, landscape preserv
         ation
SamEng:  Only market failures justify support to an industry in a welfare econ
         omic setting. The amenity value of the landscape can be treated as a
         public good. Agricultural production will have an effect on this valu
         e which is external to agriculture. Recent studies find that the will
         ingness to pay for landscape preservation (WTP) may be considerable a
         nd that the marginal willingnss to pay (MWP) decreases with the volum
         e and intensity of agricultural activity. In this paper we discuss wh
         ether the amenity benefits of the agricultural landscape justify the
         level and form of agricultural support in a high support country like
          Norway. Based on existing studies of WTP we infer the likely value o
         f parameters in a WTP function for Norway. We include this WTP functi
         on in the objective function of a price endogenous mathematical progr
         amming model for the Norwegian agricultural sector. Given no other su
         pport to agriculture than that generated by the MWP for landscape pre
         servation, the optimal size of Norwegian agriculture measured by empl
         oyment is less than 20% of the current level, while land use is betwe
         en 50% and 60% of today`s use. The simultation experiment indicates t
         hat only a minor fraction of today`s generous support would be upheld
          in optimum, while production would drop to low levels. But even if t
         he landscape preservation argument is not able to defend today`s leve
         l of production and employment, it may be strong enough to keep a maj
         or part of today`s  agricultural surface under cultivation.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008199
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

11
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Buchholz, Wolfgang
         Universität Regensburg
Medforf: Konrad, Kai A.
         Freie Universität Berlin
Medforf: Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public go
         ods
Tidskr:  Review of Economic Design
År:      1997
Volum:   3
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 29-43
Emneord: Voluntary provision of public goods, Stackelbergs games
SamEng:  We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a
          public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the
         process o making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an
          incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even
         in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making co
         ntributions to the public good.The Stackelberg leader is willing to a
         ccept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-coo
         perative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If
          the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threath poin
         t of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg lea
         der will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98008544
StatKat: f

12
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Corvellec, Jean-Noël
         Univ. de Perpignan
Medforf: Flåm, Sjur
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Nonconvex feasibility problems and proximal point methods
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-03
Hefte:   0296
Side(r): 11
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: feasibility problems, proximal point methods, Bregman functions, vari
         ational principle, alternating projections.
SamNor:  A feasibility problems typically amounts to locate at least one point
          which belongs to several closed subsets of an Euclidean space. We de
         velop a method to solve such problems whil e allowing the sets to be
         nonconvex. The method uses proximal point iterations, possibly with B
         regman distances. We also briefly consider the classical case when al
         l sets at hand are convex.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97006030
StatKat: f

13
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Evstigneev, I.V.
         Academy of Sciences of Russia
Medforf: Flåm, S.D.
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  The turnpike property and the central limit theorem in stochastic mode
         ls of economic dynamics
Tidskr:  Statistics and Control of Stochastic Processes. The Liptser
          Festchrift.
Red:     Kabanov, Y.M.
Red:     Rozovskij, B.L
Red:     Shiryaev, A.N
År:      1997
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 63-101
Utgiver: World Scientific
SamEng:  The paper analyzes asymptotic properties of optimal paths in multisec
         tor stochastic models of economic dynamics. We find conditions under
         which the of convergence in stochastic turnpike theorems is exponenti
         al. Using this result, we prove a functional central limit theorem fo
         r sums of random rewards accumulated along the optimal paths.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98008549
StatKat: f

14
PublKat: A05 (Kapittel i faglig bok, rapport m.v. (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Evstigneev, Igor
         CEMI, Russian Academy of Sciences
Medforf: Flåm, Sjur
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Noncooperative games in networks; stability and sensitivity of
         equilibria
Tidskr:  Complementarity and variational problems
         (SIAM proceedings series)
Red:     Ferris, Michael
Red:     Pang, Jong-Shi
ISBN:    0-89871-391-9
År:      1997
Hefte:   157
Side(r): 62-75
Utgiver: Philadelphia: Siam
Emneord: Noncooperative games, Nash equilibrium, directed graphs, duality,
         monotonicity, variational inequalities, stability, sensitivity,
         stochastic optimization
SamNor:  The objects under study are noncooperative games in networks.
         Examples include discrete-time dynamic games and spatial
         oligopolies.We characterize Nash equilibria in terms o f dual
         variables. It is shown that such variables help to decompose play
         across the vertices of the network, and to prove results on
         stability, sensitivity of equilibria.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97007490
StatKat: f

15
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur Didrik
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Kaniovski, Yuri
         International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Tittel:  Price expectations, cobwebs, and stability
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-05-28
Hefte:   0497
Side(r): 13
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: Cobweb models, adaptive learning, rational expectations, stochastic a
         pproximation, fixed point, stability.
SamNor:  There is given a market for several perishable goods, supplied under
         technological randomnes and price uncertainty. We study whether and h
         ow producers eventually may learn rational price expectations. The mo
         del is of cobweb type. Its dynamics fit standard forms of stochastic
         approximation. Relying upon quite weak and natural assumptions we pro
         ve new convergence results.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97007487
StatKat: f

16
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Svarstad, Roger Elling
Tittel:  Appropriating a streddling fish stock
Serie:   Working paper
År:      1997-06-11
Hefte:   0597
Side(r): 12
Emneord: fisheries management, straddling stocks, Markow decisions processes,
         linear programming, game theory.
SamNor:  This note considers the possibillity of managing a fish stock so as t
         o reduce its exposure to common access. The setting is such that one
         party, in extremis, can appropriate all catch. For illustration we ta
         ke the Norwegian herring, maybe one of the largest and most valuable
         straddling stocks there are. Apart from focusing on pressing policy i
         ssues, our main objective is to briing out the tractability of Markow
          decisions processes, in modelling and computation a second aim is to
          indicate the good prospects for applied games theoretical studies.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97007498
StatKat: f

17
PublKat: A04 (Artikkel i norsk vitenskapelig tidsskrift (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Kjelby, Torhild
         Scandia
Medforf: Rødseth, Tor
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Fiskeformue og forvaltningsstrategi
Tidskr:  Økonomi og Økologi
År:      1997
Hefte:   23
Side(r): 196-206
Utgiver: ad Notam Gyldendal
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r97007492
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

18
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Gradient approaches to equilibrium
Tidskr:  Recent Advances in Optimization. Lecture Notes in Economic
         and Mathematical Systems 452.
Red:     Gritzmann, P
Red:     Horst, R.
Red:     Sachs, E. and Titchatschke
ISBN:    3-540-63022-8
År:      1997-09
Hefte:   162
Side(r): 49-60
Utgiver: Springer
Emneord: Equilibrium, non-cooperative games, variational inequalities, saddle
         problems, convex minimization, orthogonal projections, projected
         subgradient, Hilbert space, weak convergence
SamEng:  The main objects here are equilibrium problems of monotone type.
         Examples include convex minimization, convex-concave saddle problems,
         monotone variational inequalities, and many non-cooperative games. To
         solve such problems we propose a method using approximate
         subgradient, inexact orthogonal projections, and predetermined step
         sizes, the latter forming a divergent series. Our motivation stems in
         part from non-cooperative games where the algorithm might depict an
         adaptive mode of repeated play. Granted excistence it is shown that
         the metho d generates a sequence which converges to such an outcome
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008101
StatKat: f

19
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Mirman, Leonard J.
         University of Virginia
Tittel:  Groping for Optimal Growth
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-10
Hefte:   0897
Side(r): 17 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: Optimal growth, Euler equation, asymptotic stability, stochastic appp
         roximation, strong law of larger numbers.
SamEng:  The main objects here are nonlinear dynamic stochastic systems of eco
         nomic sort, stemming from models of economic growth. The issue is whe
         ther and how agents can identify their best behavior in the long run,
          knowing neither the system dynamics nor the exact law of the random
         variables. To come to grip with this problem we model a process of ad
         aptive adjustment, and provide reasonable conditions under which the
         resulting tâtonnement yields convergence to long-run optimal behavior
         .
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008955
StatKat: f

20
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Flåm, Sjur
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Restricted attention, myopic play, and the learning of equilibrium
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997
Hefte:   0997
Side(r): 11 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: noncooperative games, Nash equilibruim, learning, Cournot beliefs, pr
         ojected gradient, spatial oligopoly
SamEng:  We consider repeated play of noncooperative games in which agents hav
         e more decisions to consider at every stage than their attention allo
         ws. Howev under a monotonicity assumption, if every variable is adjus
         ted cyclical, as guided by marginal payoffs, then myopic steps lead t
         o Nash equilibrium in the long run.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008196
StatKat: f

21
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Equilibrium retail distribution systems
Tidskr:  International Journal of Industrial Organization
År:      1997-12
Volum:   16
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 105-120
Utgiver: Elsevier Sciences B.V
Emneord: Retail distribution; Exclusive dealing; Common agency
SamEng:  I analyze producer's choice of optimal distribution systems in a sett
         ing with two producers of differentiated products and two identical r
         etailers. Producers may choose to have a single common retailer or on
         e exclusive retailer each. In an infinite horizon model the producers
          initially pick a distribution system, and once this decisions is mad
         e producers must incur a waiting cost to change. The main finding is
         that a common distribution system can be sustained if waiting cost ar
         e low enough, and welfare is reduced as compared with when producers
         have exclusive dealers.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98000281
StatKat: f

22
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Hansen, Per Svejstrup
         Department of Economics, University of Aarhus
Medforf: Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  On equilibrium selection mechanisms in coordination games with simulta
         neous play
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-09-01
Hefte:   1197
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
SamEng:  We apply the evolutionary dynamics of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)
          to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire
          popultio these games, payoffs whence best replies are determined by
         a summary statistic of the population strategy profile. Robles (1997)
          provides a simple characterization of the set of long run equilibria
          in such games. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equil
         ibrium selection depends crucially on how best responses to the summa
         ry statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all strategie s can
          become long run equilibria depending on the way pieces are defined.
         Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C79
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008080
StatKat: f
LokalK:  A

23
PublKat: D01 (Invitert foredrag ved vit. konf. med publisert artikkel (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Hansen, Torstein
         Fiskeridepartementet, Pb 8118 Dep., 0032 Oslo, Norway
Tittel:  Innlegg, Fiskerisamfunn og offentlig styring - Honningsvåg
Tidskr:  Fiskerisamfunn og offentlig styring. Konferanse i Honningsv
         åg 27. november 1997.. Fiskeindustriens lokale betydning i
         en global .. Arbeidsnotat.. 1
Red:     Lindkvist, Knut Bjørn
År:      1997-11-27
Side(r): 35-45
Utgiver: Kystnæringssenteret, Honningsvåg; Institutt for geografi
Konfer:  Fiskerisamfunn og offentlig styring.
Sted:    Honningsvåg, Norge
Emneord: Fiskeripolitikk, fiskerinæring, offentlig styring
SamNor:  Om målene for norsk fiskeripolitikk og utviklingen i næringen fra ca.
          1980 til 1996, med særlig vekt på situasjonen i Finnmark.
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r98024497
StatKat: f
LokalK:  Ns

24
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Konrad, Kai A.
         Department of Economics, Free University of Berlin
Medforf: Torsvik, Gaute
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation
Tidskr:  European Journal of Political Economy
År:      1997
Volum:   13
Hefte:   159
Side(r): 261-279
Utgiver: Elsevier Science B.V
Emneord: Regulation; Reelection; Ratchet effect; Term limits
SamEng:  The paper analyses the interdependence between incentives in bureaucr
         acy regulation in repeated agency relationships without commitment (t
         he 'ratch problem) and a regulating politi cians reelection prospects
         . A frequent change of politicians would solve the ratchet problem, b
         ut this solution is not time consistent. The ratchet effect causes a
         further problem ofmoral hazard between politicans and voters. Politic
         ans may have an incentive to waste resources in gaining competence. T
         his can further increase the welfare cost of repeated agency in burea
         ucracy regulation. Term limits can be seen as a commitment device for
          overcomming these problems.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008086
StatKat: f

25
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Kvilekval, Espen
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Vaage, Kjell
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Vårdal, Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Sammenhengen mellom pengemengdevekst og inflasjon i Norge 1960-1996.
Serie:   Arbeidsnotat
År:      1997-09
Hefte:   0197
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
SamNor:  I Norge har det ikke vært vanlig å tillegge sammenhengen mellom penge
         mengdevekst og inflasjon særlig betydning i pengepolitikken. I denne
         artikkelen vises det ved hjelp av kointegrasjonsanalyse at det i peri
         oden 19601996 finnes en statistisk signifikant sammenheng mellom kons
         umprisindeksen, utenlandske priser og pengemengden, M2. Tester for sv
         ak eksogenitet tyd er på at det er rimelig å operere med en modell de
         r konsumprisindeksen blir endogent bestemt, og utenlandske priser og
         M2 er eksogene forklaringsvariabler. Et av hovedresultatene frakointe
         grasjonsanalysen er at når M2 øker med 1% vil konsumprisindeksen stig
         e med ca. 0,49% på lang sikt. På bakgrunn av resultatene fra kointegr
         asjonsanalysen blir en såkalt feiljuste ringsmodell estimert, og det
         viser seg at M2 og utenladske priser er signifikante forklaringsvaria
         bler også på kort sikt. Tester av modellens prognoseegenskaper tyder
         på at koeffisien tene er stabile over tid, noe som taler for at M2 ka
         n benyttes som en indikator for fremtidig prisutvikling.
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r97008083
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

26
PublKat: A04 (Artikkel i norsk vitenskapelig tidsskrift (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Kvilekval, Espen
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Vårdal, Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Valutauroen ved årsskiftet 1996/97 - Årsak og lærdommer
Tidskr:  Sosialøkonomen
År:      1997
Volum:   51(8)
Hefte:   Særtryk
Side(r): 6-8
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98024472
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

27
PublKat: A05 (Kapittel i faglig bok, rapport m.v. (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Battles of the sexes: Non-cooperative games in the theory of the
         family.
Tidskr:  Economics of the family and family policies
Red:     Person, I.
Red:     Jonung, C.
ISBN:    0-415-14902-9
År:      1997
Hefte:   174
Side(r): 45-62
Utgiver: Routledge
UtgSted: London
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98004804
StatKat: f

28
PublKat: A05 (Kapittel i faglig bok, rapport m.v. (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Catching up, social capability, government size and economic growth:
         Comment.
Tidskr:  Government and growth
Red:     Bergström,
ISBN:    0-19-829037-3
År:      1997-12
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 136-148
Utgiver: Clarendon Press
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98008540
StatKat: f

29
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Lönebildning, löneskillnader och kvinnolöner
Tidskr:  Lönepolitik och kvinnors löner
         (I serie: Rapport / Forskningsrådsnämnden - FRN )
Red:     Löfström, Åsa
ISSN:    0348-3991
År:      1997
Hefte:   4
Side(r): 60-88
Utgiver: Forskningsrådsnämnden
UtgSted: Stockholm
Språk:   swe
PublID:  r97007500
StatKat: f

30
PublKat: A04 (Artikkel i norsk vitenskapelig tidsskrift (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Lønnsdannelse, lønnsforskjeller og kvinnelønn
Tidskr:  Sosialøkonomen 51 (4)
År:      1997
Hefte:   24
Side(r): 26-36
SamNor:  Denne artikkelen forsøker å se skandinavisk lønnsutjevning i sammenhe
         ng med kvinner og menns relative lønn. Kanksje er det slik at det som
          ser ut s vellykket kvinnelønnspolitikk bare er et biprodukt av den s
         olidariske lønnspolitikken? Kanskje er det en spenning mellom en poli
         tikk som oppmuntrer kvinner til å gjøre karriere og en lønnspolitikk
         som gir det store flertallet av kvinner et lønnsløft.
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r97007493
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

31
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Lommerud, Kjell Erik
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Sørgard, Lars
         The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Tittel:  Merger and product range rivalry
Tidskr:  Journal of Industrial Organization
År:      1997-12
Volum:   16
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 21-42
Utgiver: Elsevier Sciences B.V
Emneord: Merger policy; Product differentiation; Socially optimal product vari
         ety
SamEng:  The received literature concludes that if scale economies are absent,
          mergers are often unprofitable undere Cournot competition, but alway
         s profita under Bertrand. In a linear demand model with three firms i
         nitially, where there are two merger candidates, we show that results
          will change if we introduce the number of brands as a choice variabl
         e. When a non-participating firm responds to a merger by introducing
         a new brand, the merger would often have been welfare improving, but
         it is never profitable. When the merged unit narrows its product rang
         e, the merger can be profitable, it will not be socially beneficial,
         though unless the fixed cost of marketing a brand is high an non-sunk
          and brands are close substitutes.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98000273
StatKat: f

32
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Mackinson, Steven
         University of British Columbia
Medforf: Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
         CMI
Medforf: Pitcher, Tony M.
         University of British Columbia
Tittel:  Bioeconomics and catchability: Fish and fishers behaviour during stock
          collapse
Tidskr:  Fisheries Research
År:      1997-12
Volum:   31
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 11-17
Utgiver: Elsevier Sciences B.V
Emneord: Constant CPUE model; Csirke-MacCall model; Schaefer model; Density-de
         pendent catchability; Investment; Dis-investment: Small scholling pel
         agic fish
SamEng:  During periods of stock collapse, an increase in the catchability exh
         ibited by many small pelagic fish is a consequences of two factors: t
         heir schooling habit and the remarkable efficiency of today's technol
         ogy intensive fishing fleets. The net result is that a virtually cons
         tant catch per unit effort may be achieved regardless of stock sisze.
          Three models of catchabillity used to highlight the consequences of
         fish behaviour and fishing technology during stock collapse (Pitcher,
          1995) are extended to examine the effects of incorporating profit mo
         tivated economic behaviour fishers. Three scenarios are examined: (1)
          cooperation by fishers to achieve maximum economic yield (MEY); (2)
         non-cooperation resulting in open access equilibrium; (3) non-coopera
         tion with allocation of subsidies allowing fishers to inrease effort
         beyond the open access equilibrium. Incorporating economic behaviour
         i the density-dependent catchability models may result in an alarming
          increase in the rate of stock depletion, since fishers maintain high
          profits even during low stock abundance. Ew discuss the consequenses
          of using a model where catchability is assumed constant for the mana
         gement of fisheries on small schooling pelagic fish.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98000302
StatKat: f

33
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Nese, Gjermund
         SNF
Medforf: Tveit, Yngvar
         Den norske stats oljeselskap a.s
Medforf: Vårdal, Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Risikopremie og kapitalmobilitet
Serie:   Arbeidsnotat
År:      1997-09
Hefte:   0297
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
SamNor:  I denne artikkelen drøftes hvilke faktorer som påvirker kapitalmobili
         teten mellom land. Utgangspunktet vårt er porteføljevalgsmodellen sli
         k den er formulert av Dornbusch (1983) og Frankel (1982). Frankel (19
         86) inneholder en diskusjon av porteføljevalgsmodellens evne til å fo
         rklare risikopremien mellom lang. Et viktig poeng i Frankels artikkel
          er at med rimelig anslag på parametrene i modellen, dvs. relativ ris
         ikoaversjon og valutarisiko, blir risikopremien i likevekt liten. Dor
         nbusch og Frankes analyse bygger på forutsetningene om kjøpekra ftspa
         ritet, homogene forventninger og fravær av kontroll med kapitalbevege
         lser. Vi diskuterer i hvor stor grad brudd på disse forutsetningene p
         åvirker størrelsen på risikopremien. Ba sert på norske undersøkelser
         tallfestes graden av kapitalmobilitet mellom Norge og Utlandet. Mens
         kapitalmobiliteten var imperfekt på 70- og 80 tallet, argumenterer vi
          for at grade n av imperfeksjon har minket på 90-tallet. Kapitalmobil
         iteten er nå såpass perfekt at steriliserte intervensjoner har liten
         innvirkning på valutakursen.
Språk:   nor
PublID:  r97008082
StatKat: f
LokalK:  A

34
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Nordås, Hildegunn Kyvik
         CMI
Tittel:  How liberalization of trade in servises may conserve natural resources
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-11
Volum:   1397
Side(r): 34 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
SamEng:  A three-sector model of trade and location where two sectors produce
         intermediate inputs to the third sector is constructed. One of the in
         termediat sectors is located in the south and produces a freely trade
         d homogenous input, whie the othter produces a differentiated input w
         hich is traded subject to transport costs. The impact of declining tr
         ansports costs is analyzed. Multiple equilibria occur for reasonable
         parameter values, but none of the equilibria involves agglomeration.
         As transport costs decline, the North - South income gap narrows, the
          relative price of the homogeneous input, interpreted as a primary co
         mmodity, increase and volume producted declines. Nevertheless, produc
         tion of final goods increases as differentiated inputs substitute for
          primary inputs.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98020382
StatKat: f

35
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Olsen, Trond E
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Medforf: Torsvik, Gaute
         UiB-SV: Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Authority and Incentives in Ongoing Organizations
Serie:   Working Paper
År:      1997-04
Hefte:   0397
Side(r): 18
SamNor:  If workers are given lax job instructions they may use too much time
         and energy to work on private projects, and ignore the job they are h
         ired to d way for the principal to mitigate this problem is to withdr
         aw authority and impose bureaucratic job prescriptions. Alternatively
         , she can use incentives to induce workers to focus on tasks they are
          hired to do. We analyse this link between authority and incentives w
         ithin organizations. We consider an organization that lasts for many
         periods. It is therefore possible for the principale to learn the val
         ue of crucial parameters associated with the job, or the agent as tim
         e passes. It turns out that this kind of learning has an important im
         pact on the link between authority and incentives.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97006813
StatKat: f
LokalK:  N

36
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Raffelhüschen, Bernd
         Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg
Medforf: Risa, Alf Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Generational accounting and intergenerational welfare
Tidskr:  Public choice
År:      1997-12
Volum:   93
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 149-163
Utgiver: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands
SamEng:  We investigate the intergenerational welfare implications of Generati
         onal Accounting when it is used as the basis for intertemporal fiscal
          policy decisions. In particular, ew consider an economy with a PAYGO
          social security system out of steady state due to a permanent fall i
         n fertillity. In a highly stylized CGE overlapping generations model
         we illustrate that policy recommendations based on a standard applica
         tion of Generational Accounting may not be compatible with intertempo
         ral welfare maximization. Our model provides an example where such po
         licies are either time inconsistent or welfare-decreasing.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98000268
StatKat: f

37
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Risa, Alf Erling
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Economic evaluation of vocational rehabilitation programs
Tidskr:  Social policy and the Labor Market
Red:     de Jong, P.R
Red:     Marmor, T.R
År:      1997-09
Volum:   2
Hefte:   161
Side(r): 191-203
Utgiver: Aldershot: Ashgate
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r97008100
StatKat: f

38
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
         University of British Columbia
Tittel:  Cooperative and non-cooperative exploitation of the arcto-norwegian co
         d stock
Tidskr:  Environmental and Resource Economics
År:      1997-12
Volum:   10
Hefte:   Reprint
Side(r): 147-165
Utgiver: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Emneord: game theory, cooperative, non-cooperative, fishery rsoures, coastal v
         essels, cod, trawlers, Norway
SamEng:  A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod sto
         ck is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be real
         ized from resource, and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainab
         ility under cooperation and non-cooperation. The two agents are ident
         ified in this study as a trawl fishery versus a coastal fishery. Unli
         ke in Munro (1979), where conflicts in the management strategies of a
         gents arise from differences in the perceptions of the discount facto
         r, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences, here conflicts ari
         se mainly from the differences in fishing gear and grounds, and the a
         ge group og cod targeted by the two agents. Using a game theoretic fr
         amework, we show that given available data, the optimum optimoum is o
         btained under cooperation with side payments and no predetermined har
         vest shares, in which case the coastal fishery buys out the trawl fis
         hery. However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the price premium a
         ssumed for mature cod is taken away, the trawl fishery takes over as
         the producer of the optimum optimorum.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98000287
StatKat: f

39
PublKat: A11 (Artikkel i internasjonalt vitenskapelig tidsskrift med referee)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
         CMI
Tittel:  Strategic dynamic interaction: The case of Barents Sea fisheries
Tidskr:  Marine Resource Economics
År:      1997
Volum:   12
Hefte:   172
Side(r): 77-94
Emneord: Capelin, cod, game theory, joint and separate management, predatopr,
         prey.
SamEng:  This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries
          that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationsships between co
         d and capelin, the two species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze
         joint (cooperative) versus separate (nooncooperative) management of t
         his predator-prey system with a view to isolating the efficiency loss
          due to separate management. Using a game theoretic framework and a m
         ulticohort age-structure age-structure biomodel, we compute joint and
          separate management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investiga
         te the effects of changes in economic parameters on the computed resu
         lts. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the predato
         r-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalties du
         e to noncooperation. Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) un
         der current market conditions, it is economically optimal to exploit
         both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management; (
         ii) in comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe redu
         ction of the capelin fishery is called for under joint management; an
         d (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the exter
         nalties duet to the natural interactions between the species is signi
         ficant, reaching up to almost a quarter of what is achievable under s
         eparate management.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98008551
StatKat: f

40
PublKat: C11 (Rapport utgitt av institusjon, forening, o.a.)
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Vagstad, Steinar
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Centralized vs. decentralized procurement: Does dispersed information
         call for decentraliced decision-making
Serie:   Working paper
År:      1997-12-08
Volum:   1497
Side(r): 15 s.
Utgiver: Institutt for økonomi
Emneord: Incentive contracts; Auctions; Discrimination; Procurement; Quality
SamEng:  Should the government procure equipment for its agencies or let them
         run their own procurement auctions? Suppose the agency has private in
         formation product quality, but is inclined to favor local suppliers.
         Decentralization saves bureaucracy and "agency costs" (costs tied to
         thruthful revelation of quality inromation), but leads to biased deci
         sions ( a discriminatory auction). I show that the costs associated w
         ith discrimination may increase when the quality differences (or the
         probability that the agency knows the quality ) increase. Moreover, t
         his effect may be dominant, implying that increased importance of loc
         al information may be an argument for centralization.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98020383
StatKat: f

41
PublKat: A05 (Kapittel i faglig bok, rapport m.v. (t.o.m. 1998))
Instit:  Universitetet i Bergen, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Institutt for økonomi
Forf:    Vagstad, Steinar
         UiB, Institutt for økonomi
Tittel:  Information rent and technology choice in a regulated firm.
         (Contributions to economics)
Tidskr:  Firms, Markets and Contracts. Contributions to
         Neoinstitutional Economic.
Red:     Picot, A.
Red:     Schlicht, E.
ISBN:    3-7908-0947-0
År:      1997
Hefte:   173
Side(r): 76-94
Utgiver: Physica-Verlag
UtgSted: Heidelberg
Emneord: Regulation, investment, information rent, technology choice,
         non-commitment
SamEng:  Regulated firms are not necessarily willing to invest in cost
         minimizing technologies, but evaluate different technologies
         according to their impac the imformation rent. In a two-type adverse
         selection model three kinds of investments are considered:
         Investments that increase the probability of having low costs;
         investments that reduce the cost of low-cost types; and investments
         that reduce the cost of high-cost types. If the investment costs are
         negligible and the regulatro can commit to regulatory mechanisms
         before the firm invests, the firm will pick the first-best (cost
         minimizing) technology. This will also be the outcome without
         regulatory commitment as long as the investments are unobservable.
         Ifobservable investments are sunk before the regulatory scheme is set
         up, the firm has generally weak incentives to invest, as well as
         distorted incen tives regarding what type of investments to underta
         ke.
Språk:   eng
PublID:  r98020380
StatKat: f


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